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[...] Given how yesterday’s debate between William Lane Craig and Sam Harris went, imagine my surprise when I read John Loftus’s comments on the debate, over at his comically-named Debunking Christianity blog: [...]

I read your summary but came away with the opposite conclusion. Harris won this debate handily.

As you say, Craig made two fundamental arguments. His first argument takes as axiomatic that a) God exists and b) God is good. It was then appropriate for Harris to question these assumptions and deliver arguments to dismantle them. I don't understand why you (and Craig) accuse him of being off-topic. Craig made it the topic.

Harris addressed Craig's second argument several times. The most interesting and convincing to me was his analogy to other domains where we also don't have "objective" sources to ground them but nonetheless take them to be scientific and profoundly useful. e.g. medicine.

nketter you write, “As you say, Craig made two fundamental arguments. His first argument takes as axiomatic that a) God exists and b) God is good. It was then appropriate for Harris to question these assumptions and deliver arguments to dismantle them. I don’t understand why you (and Craig) accuse him of being off-topic. Craig made it the topic.”

This is simply mistaken, Craig was quite clear his contention to defend two conditional claims these were.

1. If God exists we have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties;

2. If God does not exist we do not have a sound foundation for these.

Moreover, Craig noted that by God he was using the standard definition of God as an “all knowing all good perfectly good immaterial person”.

So Craig was not assuming God exists, nor was he assuming that God was good. His claim was “if” a God exists that fits the standard definition then one has a defensible and plausible account of moral obligation. Attacking the existence of God does not address this conditional at all.

You don’t refute a conditional: If P then Q by arguing P is false.
If I say to you, if you walk on the road you will die. The response “that’s not true because I am sitting on the couch and not on the road” does not really address the issue. To refute one Harris needs to show that even if God exists the divine command theory is indefensible or implausible.

Its also worth noting that even if Craig did make the existence of God his assumption. Most of Harris arguments did not even address the existence of God. What they addressed were certain Christian doctrines of hell, particularism, and also the notion of biblical inerrancy. None of these doctrines were the issue of the debate.

As to the second contention, Craig actually delivered a pretty powerful critique of Harris position he noted that if A is identical to B then there is no possible world where A is not B, but Harris in his own book grants that there are possible worlds “where evil people primarily flourish” This requires Harris to deny the laws of identity. Harris never addressed this argument once, to suggest a position is defensible when its been shown to entail a contradiction because the author has offered arguments against Christianity is, quite bluntly, illogical.

Harris also ignored the “ought implies can” problem and the “is ought problem”. Both of which are quite serious objections.

What was clear from the debate was that some skeptics think that if a speaker raises a series of angry attacks on Christian doctrines, which are not even the topic of the debate then you can ignore the demonstrated contradictions in your own position. To call these people defenders of reason is a joke.

nketter you write, "As you say, Craig made two fundamental arguments. His first argument takes as axiomatic that a) God exists and b) God is good. It was then appropriate for Harris to question these assumptions and deliver arguments to dismantle them. I don't understand why you (and Craig) accuse him of being off-topic. Craig made it the topic."

This is simply mistaken, Craig was quite clear his contention to defend two conditional claims these were.

1. If God exists we have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties;

2. If God does not exist we do not have a sound foundation for these.

Moreover, Craig noted that by God he was using the standard definition of God as an "all knowing all good perfectly good immaterial person".

So Craig was not assuming God exists, nor was he assuming that God was good. His claim was "if" a God exists that fits the standard definition then one has a defensible and plausible account of moral obligation. Attacking the existence of God does not address this conditional at all.

You don't refute a conditional: If P then Q by arguing P is false.
If I say to you, if you walk on the road you will die. The response "that's not true because I am sitting on the couch and not on the road" does not really address the issue. To refute one Harris needs to show that even if God exists the divine command theory is indefensible or implausible.

Its also worth noting that even if Craig did make the existence of God his assumption. Most of Harris arguments did not even address the existence of God. What they addressed were certain Christian doctrines of hell, particularism, and also the notion of biblical inerrancy. None of these doctrines were the issue of the debate.

As to the second contention, Craig actually delivered a pretty powerful critique of Harris position he noted that if A is identical to B then there is no possible world where A is not B, but Harris in his own book grants that there are possible worlds "where evil people primarily flourish" This requires Harris to deny the laws of identity. Harris never addressed this argument once, to suggest a position is defensible when its been shown to entail a contradiction because the author has offered arguments against Christianity is, quite bluntly, illogical.

Harris also ignored the "ought implies can" problem and the "is ought problem". Both of which are quite serious objections.

What was clear from the debate was that some skeptics think that if a speaker raises a series of angry attacks on Christian doctrines, which are not even the topic of the debate then you can ignore the demonstrated contradictions in your own position. To call these people defenders of reason is a joke.

“The most interesting and convincing to me was his analogy to other domains where we also don’t have “objective” sources to ground them but nonetheless take them to be scientific and profoundly useful. e.g. medicine.”
Actually this is a mistake as well, what Harris did was show that we don’t need epistemological foundations for certain moral claims. Craig actually agrees with that, and has made the same point in his writings. However, as he pointed out over and over, and as the literature on divine command theory has repeated over and over, a divine command theory is a theory of an ontological foundation, not an epistemic foundation. This is elementary philosophical distinction which Craig explained in the opening speech and any reading of the literature makes clear. It was ignored repeatedly by Harris who continued to criticise the idea that belief in the bible was an epistemological foundation for morality, despite the fact it had been made clear this was not what a divine command theory affirms. Its also quite telling that a guy who has written a book on why you don’t need religion for morality does not even now the basic distinctions and issues which are central to the major theories in the literature.

Its also interesting that Harris was quite selective here when challenged about his moral claims he replied ( quite correctly) that one does not need evidence for every claim one believes some we can justifiably believe without evidence. Then he only a few sentences latter rejected God as irrational because there is no evidence for it. This might have been funny if it was not so tragic.

Only at one point did he address the claim that religious beliefs might be immediately grounded without evidence and he rejected this on the basis that people disagree over the nature of God.

What was the debate about? a disagreement over the nature of morality. So Harris is quite content to rely on his own intuitions about morality despite the fact people disagree over what morality is and to argue these are justified without evidence. He then claims Christians are irrational for doing the very same thing.

"The most interesting and convincing to me was his analogy to other domains where we also don't have "objective" sources to ground them but nonetheless take them to be scientific and profoundly useful. e.g. medicine."
Actually this is a mistake as well, what Harris did was show that we don't need epistemological foundations for certain moral claims. Craig actually agrees with that, and has made the same point in his writings. However, as he pointed out over and over, and as the literature on divine command theory has repeated over and over, a divine command theory is a theory of an ontological foundation, not an epistemic foundation. This is elementary philosophical distinction which Craig explained in the opening speech and any reading of the literature makes clear. It was ignored repeatedly by Harris who continued to criticise the idea that belief in the bible was an epistemological foundation for morality, despite the fact it had been made clear this was not what a divine command theory affirms. Its also quite telling that a guy who has written a book on why you don't need religion for morality does not even now the basic distinctions and issues which are central to the major theories in the literature.

Its also interesting that Harris was quite selective here when challenged about his moral claims he replied ( quite correctly) that one does not need evidence for every claim one believes some we can justifiably believe without evidence. Then he only a few sentences latter rejected God as irrational because there is no evidence for it. This might have been funny if it was not so tragic.

Only at one point did he address the claim that religious beliefs might be immediately grounded without evidence and he rejected this on the basis that people disagree over the nature of God.

What was the debate about? a disagreement over the nature of morality. So Harris is quite content to rely on his own intuitions about morality despite the fact people disagree over what morality is and to argue these are justified without evidence. He then claims Christians are irrational for doing the very same thing.

Well written article, I have lost much respect for Harris after this debate. So disappointed, the debate was over after Craig's first rebuttal.

It all went down to whose framing of the debate was most successful. If the topic was limited to moral ontology, then clearly Sam Harris lost because he only lightly touched on it. It seems that he conceded this as early as his first speech. However, the actual topic of the debate was mostly in flux – I don’t believe that the debate was limited merely to moral ontology despite Craig’s insistence. If it had been so, the debate would have been so much more uninteresting. A debate on moral ontology could only appeal to those who have a philosophical background and even for them, it remains to be a highly technical topic. Also, given that both Sam Harris and Craig agree that objective morality exists, questions of grounding become moot and epistemological access become much more significant. That is, unless, Craig was prepared to argue that objective moral values could not exist in the absence of God – something he did not do. By enlarging the scope of the argument and ignoring questions of grounding, Sam Harris was able to sway the audience and even force his opponent to get out of his tightly defended comfort zone. So far from being irrelevant, Sam Harris’ attack on Christian morality was not only germaine but rhetorically effective. In the end, Sam Harris was able to frame the debate to answer this question: Which moral theory could possibly provide an “objective” standard for humans? And by “objective”, he only means that which can be examined free of bias by the scientific method. (if you’re complaining that Sam Harris is not using a definition of “objective” that’s acceptable to moral philosophers, be happy to know that neither is Craig) And on the basis of this yardstick, he was able to build a strong case for his side and deliver powerful criticisms of theistic morality.

I've largely given up on the formal debate format. Perhaps I'm being unfair, but it occurs to me that [b]some[/b] people focus too much on discussing who was the apparent winner of the contest (and "contest" seems to be an apt description) and not enough on the overall content.

An informal discussion that radio shows like Unbelievable? promote seems to be much more rewarding both for the listener and the guests.

But I've heard so much about the recent Craig/ Krauss Craig/ Harris debates that perhaps I'll give them a listen.

Ralph, you say:

Also, given that both Sam Harris and Craig agree that objective morality exists, questions of grounding become moot

What? Craig showed decisively that Harris has no grouding for objective morality. How is the issue moot if one side has no grounding for the thing he believes in, and therefore is implicitly relying on the truth of the other side in order to make his own case?

That is, unless, Craig was prepared to argue that objective moral values could not exist in the absence of God – something he did not do.

What debate were you watching? He did this and more. Look at the arguments I list for his opening statement: 3–5 and 7–9 are all concerned in some way with showing that objective moral values could not exist in the absence of God!

So far from being irrelevant, Sam Harris’ attack on Christian morality was not only germaine but rhetorically effective.

It wasn't germane at all, as I argued in this article. You can't attack Christian morality without offering a viable substitute from which to launch your attack. Harris failed utterly to do this. No doubt he scored some rhetorical points with the "cheerleaders", as Craig calls them, but debates are supposed to be about arguments. Harris didn't present any of worth.

And by “objective”, he only means that which can be examined free of bias by the scientific method. (if you’re complaining that Sam Harris is not using a definition of “objective” that’s acceptable to moral philosophers, be happy to know that neither is Craig)

Of course, "objective" does not mean "examinable free of bias via the scientific method" in any kind of philosophy. One assumes Harris knows this—and we have only your word for how we should interpret him. Harris certainly seemed to want to affirm some kind of objective morality, in the proper sense of that term. As for Craig's use of the term, again, we have only your word for it. Since Craig is a philosopher, I'm more inclined to believe that he's using the term correctly, unless you can point out his error.

And on the basis of this yardstick, he was able to build a strong case for his side and deliver powerful criticisms of theistic morality.

I'm going to assume that you're one of the "cheerleaders" Craig talks about—no considered, objective (hah) analysis of this debate could possibly yield that conclusion. Craig demolished his case, and his criticisms of theistic morality looked like they were taken straight from Dawkins, which is high-school level at best, and has been answered many times over.

Bsquibs, I tend to agree with you that debates often end up being about "winners" rather than arguments, but as Craig points out in his recent Facebook post, the people that do this are "cheerleaders" for their cause, and aren't in a good position to judge the debates. They're just there to cheer their side, arguments be damned. But there are plenty of "analysts", too, who are in such a position, and for them the debates are very instructive.

I'd actually highly recommend watching both debates, just to get a sense of where New Atheists are currently at with their arguments—and how weak they are.

I may do that.

On another note, may I make a suggestion of my own? You (or anyone else for that matter) should check out the work of Vinoth Ramachandra. He is a deeply intelligent Christian activist involved in challenging injustice. His blog is excellent – http://vinothramachandra.wordpress.com/.

There are also a number of debates of his on Veritas.org.

Brilliant write up… After reading some of the comments on youtube it was refreshing to read some intelligence. Something that sticks out for me is that in the actual debate only Craig has an objective moral grounding and moral obligation to be honest & truthful, whereas Harris on the other hand with his 'landscape' can be manipulating, misleading, a liar, deceitful, distracting etc. if he feels 'well being' from it or it gives him an opportunity to be the strongest/fittest survivor. The perfect 'moral landscape' for a narcissist I may add.

JF, I think that's a very accurate observation: it's hard to see how wellbeing fits in with our intuitions about how to act in many cases.

There are also a lot of other problems. Whose wellbeing we should seek to maximize, for example? Harris seems to think that we should maximize the wellbeing of all people as much as possible. But what if this leads to everyone being generally unhappy? What if you could maximize the wellbeing of a larger group at the expense of a smaller group? Why should this not be permissible? Under Harris's utilitarianism, wouldn't this be the more desirable outcome?

Or, how can we justify making wellbeing identical with goodness? Our moral intuitions tell us that it is sensible to say, "It is good to be good". It's tautologous, but we understand that it is true precisely because it is tautologous. But when Harris asks us believe that "It maximizes wellbeing to be good" and "It is good to maximize wellbeing" are logically equivalent statements, our BS detectors quickly start ringing.

[...] This comprehensive summary is from Thinking Matters New Zealand. It is entertaining to read, but accurate and comprehensive. [...]

Just on this point, what makes God, or His character, perfect or good? Is there some objective reason why Mercy, for example, is good?

Thanks.

Please explain how god could not say rape, murder, slavery, and the torture of children are moral acts.

Would anyone like to update the section on the criticisms of Sma Harris book with Craig's comments. I added a few and linked to the Q and A but I think the section on criticism deserves some beefing up with all of Craig's criticisms. I also afraid Harris' fanboys will edit down the article. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Moral_Landscape#…

Hey Lee, well as Craig said, moral values are derived from God's character. God's character is not arbitrary or changeable; it is perfect and immutable. It's not like God wakes up one day feeling nice, and then the next day he gets out the wrong side of bed and decides to be evil. God is always perfect—and his moral perfection precludes him just declaring that rape and murder are good today.

When you think about who and what God is, you'll see that the idea that he could simply make evil things good by fiat doesn't actually make sense. People like to take the Euthyphro Dilemma and say, Well, either God knows that murder is immoral, in which case morality transcends him; or he just decides that murder is immoral, in which case he could always decide otherwise. But in fact, he couldn't decide otherwise, so the objection makes no sense.

Hope this helps; let me know if I haven't been clear (:

Wow, your assessment of the debate is so off that I don’t even know where to start.

I love how Craig’s nut-huggers (like you) throw a tizzy when your messiah’s rhetorical rubbish is juxtaposed against intelligent, salient, thought-provoking, common-sense insights.

I guess it really sucks when Craig’s “brilliance” is exposed for the the worthless gibberish that is actually is.

And I especially love how you all go on and on about how Harris “went off topic” as though it is a capital offense, yet you completely ignore the 800-pound gorilla in the room, namely, that your boy, Craig, exhibits an absurd degree of intellectual dishonesty.

But I guess substance, integrity and rational thought aren’t your bag of tea, eh?

Yea…belief in a big sky daddy trumps all.

You go, girl!

What say you?

Later, bitch.

Hello Stephen Kipp,

Your comments score;
0 reasons. 0 examples. = 0 thinking. = worthless opinion. = modify method or don’t comment again.

[...] of course, you can find Bnonn’s thoughts on the clash here. blog comments powered by Disqus [...]

[...] Thinking Matters [...]

“Harris’s critique of God’s character is irrelevant and off topic”

Yep, it’s “off topic” to point out that you “ground your morality ” on the alleged will of a profoundly immoral being .

People who can’t distinguish between Gods nature and/or character, and Biblical revelation shouldn’t pontificate on the relevancy of Harris’ “rebuttal”. They obviously don’t know what they’re talking about.

Stuart McEwing

[...] Did you see the debate, Lee? If so, is it true, as one Christian website claimed, that Craig “thrashed Sam Harris like a naughty puppy?” – [...]

The only way you can, as you say, “blow Harris’ argument out of the water”, is to redefine it as you did in summary point #4 under “Craig crushes Harris”. If you redefine flourishing as some evil people primarily flourishing, no doubt at the expense of others, then humans as a whole are not flourishing. Harris is talking about facts we know apply to everybody, like we prefer to breath clean air and eat decent food. If you take that away from someone else, so that you flourish, you are breaking Harris’ moral code.

On the contrary, John, Craig explicitly uses Harris’s own premises to formulate his argument—he even quotes Harris to make this doubly clear. His argument is an internal critique. So I suspect you’re misunderstanding Harris if you think Craig is redefining his position.

[...] and cheerleading in the scientific community lately about morality, and particularly about Sam Harris’s view as opposed to William Lane Craig’s. At SciBlogs, Ken Perrott ruminates on the foundations of human morality and draws some strikingly [...]

[...] New Atheist pitbull PZ Myers recently described William Lane Craig as a “dogmatic fool”, in reference to Craig’s debate with Sam Harris on the foundations of morality. [...]

Bnonn, unfortunately some of Harris’s cheer leaders don’t understand that identity claims hold in all possible worlds. Hence if you claim that goodness is identical with human well being, then all that needs to be shown is that its possible that the two come apart and then its not identical. To claim “harris is talking about facts” ignores this point. The fact is its impossible for two identical things to be different, that’s what it means to say they are identical.

Bnonn, unfortunately some of Harris’s cheer leaders don’t understand that identity claims hold in all possible worlds. Hence if you claim that goodness is identical with human well being, then all that needs to be shown is that its possible that the two come apart and then its not identical. To claim “harris is talking about facts” ignores this point. The fact is its impossible for two identical things to be different, that’s what it means to say they are identical.

In no sense was this a ‘thrashing.’ I thought it was a draw at best. They both talked past each other most of the night and nothing was really accomplished. I thought Craig really lost points when Harris pushed him as to why God has to be good. 

You don’t think Craig was directly addressing Sam Harris’ moral theory? If so, you’re missing something really big and important.

“This is known as Divine Command Theory—an important theory in Christian ethics because it is unassailable by the classic objection to theistic ethics, the Euthyphro Dilemma”

This is where I stopped reading. Perfect Being Theology is imagined to be in this unassailable position following Anselm, not Divine Command Theory. DCT, using PBT, attempts to escape the horns by saying that God is the standard of value, his nature is the essence of good, he is the greatest conceivable being, etc. . Unfortunately, all of these either presuppose a standard of ‘good’ (horn 1) in attributing meaning to these phrases, or do nothing of the sort, and derive their meaning a posteriori (horn 2), suffering from the charge of arbitrariness, emptiness, or worse. The Divine Command Theorist, far from holding an unassailable position with Perfect Being Theology, find himself squarely back in the same place he so painstakingly attempted to navigate away from.

You are either unaware of this, and we should all wonder why you’re writing reviews of debates on moral philosophy in that case, or you are aware of it and lying to your audience. YOU linked the SEP, have you read the relevant post?

“Bnonn, unfortunately some of Harris’s cheer leaders don’t understand that identity claims hold in all possible worlds. Hence if you claim that goodness is identical with human well being, then all that needs to be shown is that its possible that the two come apart and then its not identical. To claim “harris is talking about facts” ignores this point. The fact is its impossible for two identical things to be different, that’s what it means to say they are identical.”

The goodness of an act is not intrinsic to the act itself, but predicated upon the effect the act produces. This is why Harris asserts(rightly, imo), that if you scratch the surface of even a deontologist, you find a consequentialist lurking beneath. That said, Craig’s “knockdown argument” is nothing of the sort. He points out a concession made by Harris, that a rapist could occupy a peak in his moral landscape(though not a very high one, as you will see), but he does not show that this means goodness and well-being are not identical. The relevant passage from his notes is as follows:

“We already know that psychopaths have brain damage that prevents them from having certain deeply satisfying experiences (like empathy) that seem good for people both personally and collectively (in that they tend to increase well-being on both counts). Psychopaths, therefore, don’t know what they are missing (but we do). The position of a psychopath also cannot be generalized; it is not, therefore, an alternative view of how human beings should live (this is one point Kant got right: even a psychopath couldn’t want to live in a world filled with psychopaths). We should also realize that the psychopath we are envisioning is a straw man: watch interviews with real psychopaths, and you will find that they do not tend to claim to be in possession of an alternative morality or to be living deeply fulfilling lives. These people are generally ruled by compulsions that they don’t understand and cannot resist. It is absolutely clear that, whatever they might believe about what they are doing, psychopaths are seeking some form of well-being (excitement, ecstasy, feelings of power, etc.), but because of their neurological and social deficits, they are doing a very bad job of it. We can say that a psychopath like Ted Bundy takes satisfaction in the wrong things, because living a life purposed towards raping and killing women does not allow for deeper and more generalized forms of human flourishing.”

It continues, but that is the gist. It should be clear that Craig did not honestly represent Sam’s writing, and was simply trying to score points in a debate and/or derail the discussion, when trumpeting this as a “knockdown argument” using “Harris’ own premises”. A response would entail an extensive clarification, taking time better spent elsewhere, while ignoring it would allow Craig to come back and claim that his superfluous parlor trick was un-refuted. As Sam pointed out on his blog:

Those who expected me to follow the path Craig cut in his opening remarks don’t seem to understand the game he was playing. He knew that if he began, “Here are 5 (bogus) points that Sam Harris must answer if he has a shred of self-respect,” this would leave me with a choice between delivering my prepared remarks, which I believed to be crucial, or wasting my time putting out the small fires he had set. If I stuck to my argument, as I mostly did, he could return in the next round to say, “You will notice that Dr. Harris entirely failed to address points 2 and 5. It is no wonder, because they make a mockery of his entire philosophy.”

As I observed once during the debate, but should have probably mentioned again, Craig employs other high school debating tricks to mislead the audience: He falsely summarizes what his opponent has said; he falsely claims that certain points have been conceded; and, in our debate, he falsely charged me with having wandered from the agreed upon topic. The fact that such tricks often work is a real weakness of the debate format, especially one in which the participants are unable to address one another directly. Nevertheless, I believe I was right not to waste much time rebutting irrelevancies, correcting Craig’s distortions of my published work, or taking his words out of my mouth. Instead, I simply argued for a scientific conception of moral truth and against one based on the biblical God. This was, after all, the argument that the organizer’s at Notre Dame had invited me to make.”

The irony in all of this is that Craig himself has come out and said that debates are not about getting at the truth. Debates are about winning. If you knew this simple fact, you wouldn’t take his every utterance as a counterpoint to Harris’ actual position, you would be talking about the strategic benefit of such sly abuse of the opponent’s published work and spoken word. Harris showed up to make a case, and argue against Craig’s, whilst Craig showed up to put another trophy on his mantle.

@Lee,

That’s an interesting response, thank you for sharing it. May I say you seem thoughtful in your response here. I’m a little disappointed though, that you are joining the view of others in the “church of Internet atheists”.

It is well known in academia that Harris has a significant shortcoming in the position he has advocated for the past few years. Many were waiting with bated breath for the release of Harris’s latest book, in which he was going to address the issue of how to get from an is to an ought. Clearly, Harris thinks he has done this, but he seems oblivious to the fact that he is making the logical fallacy of begging the question. You seem intelligent, so I urge you to avoid the same mistake. It is widely regarded in academic circles that Harris has still completely missed the boat in this regard. I suspect his lack of philosophical training (despite the fact that he does actually have some philosophical training) to be the main culprit here. And I think the same could be said for the rest of the “church of Internet atheists”.

I’m also disappointed on your opinion of Dr Craig’s debate tactics. You seem convinced that Harris did not have to respond to Dr Craig’s objections. Well, in a debate, that is actually exactly what you are supposed to do. Raising objections that are on topic and are rational is not some “high school debating trick”, as some seem to think. It’s actually what you’re supposed to do and it’s what makes debates so useful and intellectually stimulating. And to make the debate worth having, the other side ought to respond to the objections, and make objections of the own if they please. The point of a debate is not to go on tangents or make angry tirades against religion, as you and Dr Harris seem to think so. I was so disappointed by the debate I almost cried. I was eager for an intellectually stimulating debate, but all I got was some unanswered objections raised by Dr Craig, and an angry tirade from Harris. I was hoping Harris would give a defence of his position, but all I got was “I don’t like religion, therefore morality is natural”. And here I am speaking with you trying to point out the blindingly obvious that this is not a rational argument, and that Harris was really just – well I actually feel bad saying it, but it is actually the truth – Harris was really just *stupid* in taking this approach. It’s disappointing to be sure, but also quite reassuring to me, because it reinforced the position I already have made, that morality is NOT natural. Harris did nothing to dissuade me of that.

However, Harris did achieve one thing, and I think this is also what I believe was his purpose in the debate (not to win the debate, or provide a cogent defence of his position). He did make me feel pretty discouraged with the moral history of organized religion. Islam in particular features in Harris’s criticism, and I agree with him that Islam has a terrible moral history. In the debate, Harris also points out many moral outrages in the Old Testament of the Bible. While none of this was really on topic, it was none the less a very emotively powerful and persuasive approach. That is because many of the acts of God in the Old Testament seem to be morally reprehensible to our moral intuitions. However, what it does not do, is provide an argument that morality is natural, which was the topic of the debate, and the position Harris had taken. Worse still, this approach still assumes a morality that is transcendent, even above the God of the Old Testament. So while it’s quite emotive, it’s intellectually weak – pitifully weak in fact. So while the points raised by Harris did leave me feeling bad about religion, it also left me intellectually bereft of an actual intellectually tenable argument in defence of his position.

May I suggest that you put your own prejudices aside, look at the debate for what it was, see that the argument that morality is natural is still totally inadequate, see that morality only makes sense if God exists, and then decide for yourself whether morality actually exist or not (because the debate over whether if morality exists, is it natural or supernatural has clearly been ended, it cannot be natural). If morality does exist (and it isn’t just an illusion), then God exists and is somehow the root of morality. If morality does not exist, then God does not exist and you can do whatever you please.

The fact that Harris says things like “The fact that such tricks often work is a real weakness of the debate format” really discourages me. If Harris really thinks that said “tricks” are a weakness of debates, then I hold little hope for actual intellectual engagement from Harris in the future. I actually just think Harris doesn’t know what a debate is – that it is an interaction between two sides of a topic. Instead, he seems to think it’s an opportunity to pontificate his own perspective, without giving a defence of it in the face of objections. It’s pathetic.

Perfect Being Theology is imagined to be in this unassailable position following Anselm, not Divine Command Theory. DCT, using PBT, attempts to escape the horns by saying that God is the standard of value, his nature is the essence of good, he is the greatest conceivable being, etc. . Unfortunately, all of these either presuppose a standard of ‘good’ (horn 1) in attributing meaning to these phrases, or do nothing of the sort, and derive their meaning a posteriori (horn 2), suffering from the charge of arbitrariness, emptiness, or worse.

This makes no sense. Ex hypothesi, if good is what God is, then clearly we do not presuppose a(nother) standard of good in attributing meaning to the term—any more than we would presuppose another God in saying that God is God. And while we may derive the epistemic meaning of goodness a posteriori, we don’t derive its ontological nature in such a way, because by definition its ontological nature is what God is. So the charge of arbitrariness or emptiness is equally misguided.

In fact, people who make this objection in the first place seem to want to eat their cake and have it too. What is their answer to the grounding of moral values? Are they admitting to an infinite regress of moral standards? That is not an explanation. The charge that we can’t stop at God because that makes good arbitrary seems to presuppose an implicit belief that a God explanation is not a “real” explanation at all. But why? Why is it that, if good is what God is, then goodness is arbitrary or empty? That would seem to only be the case if, in fact, good is not what God is. So the objection seems to beg the question against the theist.

DCT [Divine Command Theory], using PBT [Perfect Being Theology], attempts to escape the horns [of the Euthyphro Dilemma] by saying that God is the standard of value, his nature is the essence of good, he is the greatest conceivable being, etc. Unfortunately, all of these either presuppose a standard of ‘good’ (horn 1) in attributing meaning to these phrases, or do nothing of the sort, and derive their meaning a posteriori (horn 2), suffering from the charge of arbitrariness, emptiness, or worse. [italics mine]

You’ve missed the point of the DCT. It is not a theory on moral sematics, but moral ontology: not about the meaning of the word “good” but about the nature of the goodness itself. Understood correctly the response DCT makes is good.

“This makes no sense. Ex hypothesi, if good is what God is, then clearly we do not presuppose a(nother) standard of good in attributing meaning to the term—any more than we would presuppose another God in saying that God is God.”

That is to say that good points to something when you say ‘good is what God is’. If I say ‘red is what apples are’, the word ‘red’ points to a specific light spectrum independent of the apple. If, on the other hand, ‘good’ used as you used it doesn’t point to anything, then that particular choice of letters in that combination is arbitrary, and it could be anything (plickler, for example). When you say someone is compassionate, you are speaking about a commonly held meaning inherent to the word ‘compassionate’. If someone is simply the embodiment of compassion, than any action they perform would then be what is meant by compassion when attributed to someone else. Any action could be compassionate, because there is no guiding standard by which said person’s behavior must adhere.

I contest the claim that arbitrariness is “misguided”, and I don’t know what you’re talking about when bringing epistemology into the equation. This isn’t about how we discover what his nature is, it’s about what his nature is.

“Why is it that, if good is what God is, then goodness is arbitrary or empty?”

Because, as I pointed out earlier, barring a referent for the term ‘good’, when used as an attribute it leaves the content open-ended.

@Lee:

That is to say that good points to something when you say ‘good is what God is’.

Yah, it points to what God is!

I say ‘red is what apples are’, the word ‘red’ points to a specific light spectrum independent of the apple.

The fact that you think this is a real analogy betrays that you don’t understand the issue at all. Red is not what apples are. Red is a color that apples are. Apples is what apples are.

When you say someone is compassionate, you are speaking about a commonly held meaning inherent to the word ‘compassionate’.

Which in no sense precludes that compassion could have its origin in an exemplar like God.

If someone is simply the embodiment of compassion, than any action they perform would then be what is meant by compassion when attributed to someone else.

Do you mean to suggest that theists claim that God is the embodiment of compassion, or goodness? Because again, that just shows you don’t understand the issue.

Because, as I pointed out earlier, barring a referent for the term ‘good’, when used as an attribute it leaves the content open-ended.

You’re reasoning in circles. The referent of the term ‘good’ is God. It’s hard to even understand your objection; you seem confused.

Thank you for the kind words! To be clear, I’m not certain I agree with either of the two debaters in their assumptions of the existence of moral facts. I find it educational to espouse an unfamiliar position on occasion in order to better understand it from the inside.

A few minor points:

1. Hume’s is/ought distinction is only avoidable through moral skepticism; i.e. the denial of ought’s altogether. Christian ethics doesn’t bridge this gap any more convincingly than naturalistic ethics does.

2. “I was hoping Harris would give a defence of his position, but all I got was “I don’t like religion, therefore morality is natural”” ~ This. He provided an argument, viz;
1. Morality is dependent on consciousness (no minds, no morality)
2. Consciousness is nature dependent. (nothing non-natural about our cognitive processes)
-> Therefore, Morality is nature dependent.

He even said, before presenting this, “So here is my argument for moral truth in the context of science…” I know for a fact that my prejudices cause me to miss/gloss over some aspects of the evidence of my sense organs, which is why I watch these debates more than once, and take notes. Perhaps a re-visit would help you see what you missed.

3. The debate over whether moral facts exist has not ended; whether moral facts can exist independent of God has not ended; whether God actually provides a ground for moral facts has not ended. To pretend otherwise is just a fantasy, as egregious as pretending that DCT isn’t directly addressed by the Euthypro Dilemma.

4. A public debate is a show, entertainment for the audience that paid to attend; not a reliable method of determining who is correct. I believe it could serve that purpose, but I have yet to see/hear it happen. This applies in any form of public debate, be it political/social/etc. Don’t conflate this meaning of the term ‘debate’ with the one more akin to the halls of academia or the pages of Nature.

I think Harris won. It’s not the first time Craig has reframed a debate on his own terms, but it seems to me to be the first time his opponent stuck to the topic more reliably. Does it matter what god Craig is arguing for? Yes, clearly, given your comments about Islam. Is it altogether surprising that Harris would attack his opponent’s position where it matters? Only Christians seem to think so. Craig isn’t arguing for some phantasmagorical deism; whatever he purports to be advocating, when he says “God is the locust of good” and “God is perfect”, he’s speaking about a specific God: God the Father, and Jesus is his son (where do you think he gets his information?). The holy trinity, the Biblical Bilbo, main character in that hellish fantasy novel. Harris was succinctly arguing against the claim that that God actually is good, in any sense that isn’t simply assessed a posterori. He already provided an argument in favor of his position before addressing Craig’s implicit position.

The remainder of your post is a serious of spurious attacks on Harris’ credibility, or the credibility of so-called “internet atheists”. Whatever that term is to mean, I would remind you that the internet is merely a communication medium. You’re on the internet, and a christian, does that make you an “internet christian”? and in so naming you, does it become demeaning, or damning, of your arguments or point of view? No, and the same applies to your treatment of Sam Harris.

Lee.

“Yah, it points to what God is!”

And that is? Good. and what is good? God. I’m the one using circular reasoning?

“The fact that you think this is a real analogy betrays that you don’t understand the issue at all. Red is not what apples are. Red is a color that apples are. Apples is what apples are.”

That is simply citing the law of identity, apples are what they are and aren’t what they aren’t. Good and God can’t be identical, just as ‘red’ and ‘apple’ can’t be. ‘Red’ in this context is an attribute; ‘good’ in this context is an attribute. To say otherwise is to say we could use the word ‘evil’ to the same effect in either scenario. It is what it is, fine, but what is that? On the other hand, if ‘good’ points to a real standard of good (and ‘red’ points to a real point on the light spectrum), then ‘good’ (and ‘red’) has meaning independent of the subject. You can identify the color ‘red’ without apples, you can, by this argument, identify good without God.

“Which in no sense precludes that compassion could have its origin in an exemplar like God.”

Exemplifying what, pray tell? Compassion? He could be the most compassionate being in existence, the “exemplar” of compassion, but he is still only displaying an ideal model of an independent standard.

“Do you mean to suggest that theists claim that God is the embodiment of compassion, or goodness? Because again, that just shows you don’t understand the issue.”

I mean to suggest that if X is the embodiment of compassion, in the absence of a standard of compassionate behavior, any action that X performs is then subsumed into the term compassionate. Murder, self-sacrifice, rape, generosity, etc., it makes no difference, because what would you appeal to in order to say X has performed an action that is not compassionate? It would seem to me that any action taken by X is by definition compassionate.

“You’re reasoning in circles. The referent of the term ‘good’ is God. It’s hard to even understand your objection; you seem confused.”

Then any action or edict God performs or issues is ‘good’, because he performed/issued it. Arbitrariness hovers on the horizon.

Lee.

Hi Stuart!

By meaning, I mean it refers to something. The difference between a word’s definition and it’s referent spell the confusion you and others seem to be having with my posts. The word ‘red’ is defined as a color, but it refers to a particular wavelength on the visible light spectrum. In the same way, the word ‘good’ is defined as positive, beneficial, etc., but it refers to a standard (be it God’s commands/nature, or something apart from God). It is the referent that I am speaking of.

1. Hume’s is/ought distinction is only avoidable through moral skepticism; i.e. the denial of ought’s altogether. Christian ethics doesn’t bridge this gap any more convincingly than naturalistic ethics does.

God’s commands are normative by definition. How does this run aground on the is/ought distinction?

2. “I was hoping Harris would give a defence of his position, but all I got was “I don’t like religion, therefore morality is natural”” ~ This. He provided an argument, viz;
1. Morality is dependent on consciousness (no minds, no morality)
2. Consciousness is nature dependent. (nothing non-natural about our cognitive processes)
-> Therefore, Morality is nature dependent.

The obvious problem is that not only did Harris fail to make a positive case for [2], but Craig decisively refuted it.

3. The debate over whether moral facts exist has not ended; whether moral facts can exist independent of God has not ended; whether God actually provides a ground for moral facts has not ended. To pretend otherwise is just a fantasy, as egregious as pretending that DCT isn’t directly addressed by the Euthypro Dilemma.

Two problems: Firstly, if you’re going speak as if you’re an authority, you should know what you’re talking about. Secondly, the mere existence of debate is hardly consequential. Why should we care that the debate continues if it is obvious that one side has already won?

I think Harris won. It’s not the first time Craig has reframed a debate on his own terms, but it seems to me to be the first time his opponent stuck to the topic more reliably.

This makes no sense. Almost everything Harris said was off topic, and almost everything Craig said was on topic.

main character in that hellish fantasy novel.

Ah, and now your true colors are on display. Your problem with God is not an intellectual one. It is an emotional one.

And that is? Good. and what is good? God. I’m the one using circular reasoning?

Two problems:

1. Good is not God. God is good. It is not all he is, but it is certainly one of his qualities.

2. You’re attacking the notion that goodness could have a ground of its existence. That it could be a properly basic property. You act as if this is problematic because it is circular. But that’s just a performance to distract us from your lack of argument. If you have a problem with a quality having a ground for its existence, you need to explain why. And as I’ve already pointed out, an infinite regress is not an explanation. Neither is a reductionistic account of morality in which it turns out that moral values don’t exist at all.

Good and God can’t be identical, just as ‘red’ and ‘apple’ can’t be.

Odd that you characterized my position as being God good then.

‘Red’ in this context is an attribute; ‘good’ in this context is an attribute.

But it is not an attribute in the same sense. Goodness is something which has its being in God. It is exemplified by God. It is ontologically grounded in God. The same cannot be said for the redness of apples. Again, you seem to just be denying that ontological grounding qualifies as a real explanation for morality. But a denial is not an argument.

Exemplifying what, pray tell? Compassion? He could be the most compassionate being in existence, the “exemplar” of compassion, but he is still only displaying an ideal model of an independent standard.

Why can he not display an ideal model of his own standard? If the standard is not independent, but in fact is God-dependent, then we should still expect God to be an ideal model of that standard.

I mean to suggest that if X is the embodiment of compassion, in the absence of a standard of compassionate behavior, any action that X performs is then subsumed into the term compassionate. Murder, self-sacrifice, rape, generosity, etc., it makes no difference, because what would you appeal to in order to say X has performed an action that is not compassionate? It would seem to me that any action taken by X is by definition compassionate.

But this just makes a strawman out of theism. Look at what you’re doing:

1. Assume God is the ground of goodness
2. Assume God can do anything, even if it contravenes his nature as the ground of goodness
3. ???
4. Profit! Good is arbitrary.

But as it turns out, God can not do anything that contravenes his nature as the ground of goodness. He does not engage in malicious or capricious actions, for example, precisely because he is good. And we know that maliciousness and capriciousness are not good because they are in opposition to God’s revealed characteristics.

You can’t redefine God as a being who can be malicious and capricious and then complain that he doesn’t offer an adequate account of the grounding of goodness due to the arbitrariness problem. Basically what you’re saying is that you don’t like that God is the ground of goodness, because you want to judge God against some other standard. But again, that is not an argument. It is a preference.

Then any action or edict God performs or issues is ‘good’, because he performed/issued it. Arbitrariness hovers on the horizon.

Only if God himself is arbitrary, which you will note that Christianity denies.

“God’s commands are normative by definition. How does this run aground on the is/ought distinction?”

Well-being is normative by definition. How does this run aground on the is/ought distinction? Moreover, it is less than clear that the God of the bible actually is good, which Harris made abundantly clear (not that it required additional clarify after Thomas Paine, et al), whereas to deny that well-being is something we ought to pursue is a bewildering loss of purchase on normativity.

“The obvious problem is that not only did Harris fail to make a positive case for [2], but Craig decisively refuted it.”

At what point did he refute this “decisively”, or really at all? All of the evidence points to a direct link between conscious events and neural events, I’m not certain Harris even needed to make a positive case (though I don’t think it’s true that he didn’t actually do this).

“Two problems: Firstly, if you’re going speak as if you’re an authority, you should know what you’re talking about. Secondly, the mere existence of debate is hardly consequential. Why should we care that the debate continues if it is obvious that one side has already won?”

Nothing of substance here. Your side won because it’s “obvious”, I don’t agree because I don’t “know what [I'm] talking about”, continued debate is “hardly consequential”. I suppose if you say so…

“This makes no sense. Almost everything Harris said was off topic, and almost everything Craig said was on topic.”

If you believe that whoever goes first determines the scope and topic, sure. Again, the comments I posted above from Sam Harris seem salient here.

“Ah, and now your true colors are on display. Your problem with God is not an intellectual one. It is an emotional one.”

In the context of the moral domain: yes, my problem with God is an emotional one. When I stop feeling emotional stimuli when considering morality, I’ll start to worry about my capacity for empathy, and probably sanity. This is how moral philosophers DO moral philosophy, and why “internet atheists” and …other atheists? find Christian ethics so alarming: to divorce the moral domain from the reality of human and animal suffering is (it seems to me) a straight path to what Kant considered a corrupted morality. Moral action not for moral reasons, but in deference to authority; an authority, as Harris argues, whose edicts go against our moral intuitions (and yes, our emotions).

If, indeed, good can only be derived from this being’s nature, I’m not so sure I want to be good.

So God’s nature is the independent standard of good, by which God’s actions are measured?

Is God’s nature good because it is God’s? or is it God’s nature because it is good?

–

“You’re attacking the notion that goodness could have a ground of its existence. That it could be a properly basic property.”

I am skeptical of this claim, but for the purposes of our discussion, I am affirming that goodness has a “ground” (if that means what I think it means). I simply think that ground is well-being. As far as it being “properly basic”, I haven’t denied this, I just think that well-being=good is far more sensible than God(or his nature)=good, and the self-evidence of well-being as good vastly outweighs God as good. Given all that Sam Harris et al have said about the god of Christianity, to claim good is a properly basic property of God is begging the question.

–

“Only if God himself is arbitrary, which you will note that Christianity denies.”

“And we know that maliciousness and capriciousness are not good because they are in opposition to God’s revealed characteristics.”

Irony: Decrying the delusional atheist for attacking christian theology in a supposedly sterile debate about moral philosophy, and then appealing to that same theology to defend problems with the philosophy. Talk about having your cake and eating it too.

–

“But it is not an attribute in the same sense.”

Yes, the analogy isn’t perfect, but your abuse doesn’t derail the salience. What you are doing is arguing from both sides of the dilemma. If I press the first horn, you slip under the second, and vice versa:

‘Red’ in this context is an attribute; ‘good’ in this context is an attribute.”

~ me, arguing that your attribute ‘good’ appeals to an independent standard, or refers to something in describing God.

“But it is not an attribute in the same sense. Goodness is something which has its being in God. It is exemplified by God. It is ontologically grounded in God. The same cannot be said for the redness of apples. ”

~ You, saying, essentially, that the good is what it is because it is God. Of course it can’t be said for the redness of apples, you have changed the claim.

Our discussion is continuing down this vein(drain?), seemingly ad infinitum, so I’ll just leave this here and part with my sincere thanks for the patience and consideration of you, Stuart, and Mr (Dr?) Gray. These topics are very fascinating to me, and it would be very disappointing, to the point of depressing, if you are right and further debate is “hardly consequential”. I feel this would be like telling all of the 5th graders that the last president has been elected, and you’ll all just have to settle on another career choice; or science has discovered all of the secrets of reality, so if you were planning on becoming a scientist to contribute to the field, think again. That’s not to say you can’t be right, it’s just my emotional take on the claim.

Lee.

Well-being is normative by definition.

1. No it isn’t.

2. Even if it were, well-being is not what we mean when we talk about moral goodness.

3. Utilitarianism is useless for grounding ethics for any number of reasons. Take the Utility Monster, for example.

4. Even if utilitarianism worked, you’d still need a theistic framework to account for moral values in the first place, since naturalism doesn’t have what it takes to cash that check.

Moreover, it is less than clear that the God of the bible actually is good, which Harris made abundantly clear

Sure, if you’re judging him by some other standard. But not only is that question-begging, but it also requires a justification of that standard.

If you want to show that God is not good, the only option available to you is an internal critique of Christianity. You can’t presuppose some other standard of morality (which is to say: presuppose that God does not exist) and then make your argument from there. No one is going to be convinced by an argument that assumes its own conclusion. But on an internal account, God’s actions are far from the monstrous atrocities that Harris ineptly makes them out to be.

At what point did he refute this “decisively”, or really at all? All of the evidence points to a direct link between conscious events and neural events, I’m not certain Harris even needed to make a positive case (though I don’t think it’s true that he didn’t actually do this).

Did you even watch the same debate I did? He makes an extended argument in http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rh8FU2UlHp4 that naturalism is incapable of underwriting moral values. Moreover, the mere fact that there is a correlation between conscious events and neural events does nothing to prove that conscious events are fully explicable in physical terms. (Perhaps you’d like to connect the premise and the conclusion to prove me wrong.) Indeed, it is a widely recognized problem in the philosophy of mind that a purely naturalistic account of the mind runs into real difficulties with mental states like intentionality. And there are excellent arguments made by philosophers in this arena that show convincingly how the existence of things as simple as truth and inference must entail substance dualism of some kind. Look up the argument from reason if you’re not familiar with this.

If you believe that whoever goes first determines the scope and topic, sure.

Surprisingly, the scope of the topic is encapsulated in the moot: “does good come from God?” That is foremost an ontological question. Yet Harris didn’t engage the ontological grounding of morality even once that I recall.

“internet atheists” and …other atheists? find Christian ethics so alarming: to divorce the moral domain from the reality of human and animal suffering is (it seems to me) a straight path to what Kant considered a corrupted morality.

This is just an argument from emotion. If you don’t have an objective ground for morality in the first place, what does it even mean to talk about “corrupted morality”? Or, if morality is not objective at all, why does it even matter? You’re trying to eat your cake and have it too. You either need to underwrite your moral claims with a cogent system of your own, or you need to show that, on Christianity, God is not good. Merely presupposing that goodness = wellbeing isn’t going to cut it. That’s barely even high-school level moral philosophy. Anyone with half a brain can see that while desiring the wellbeing of others is generally a moral good, moral goodness is not the same as desiring the wellbeing of others.

It’s also strange that you talk about finding Christian ethics “alarming” because of a divorce between the moral domain and the reality of human and animal suffering. One of the doctrines at the core of Christianity is that suffering is a result of sin, so there is an intrinsic link between the moral domain and suffering (at least human suffering; it’s unclear why animal suffering is an issue at all without anthropomorphizing animals). And another of Christianity’s core doctrines is to love one’s neighbor as oneself. Not that Christianity is chiefly concerned with alleviating suffering. That would be foolish given what we know of its origin. But it certainly is chiefly concerned with having right moral priorities—one of the benefits of which is an alleviation of suffering.

If anything, it is Christians who ought to be alarmed at the moral permissiveness of atheism. You give up morality in the name of tolerance and progress, and produce suffering as a result. Abortion and homosexuality are two obvious examples. There are heaps of studies in the deleterious effects of both. The same goes for promiscuity. Strange that the “old fashioned” belief in sex being confined to marriage results in happier couples, stronger relationships, better-adjusted children, and a more stable society.

Moral action not for moral reasons, but in deference to authority

You seem to have confused Christianity with Islam.

an authority, as Harris argues, whose edicts go against our moral intuitions

Unless you can show that our moral intuitions have any referent in the real world, and that they are consistently accurate, that’s a completely meaningless statement.

I just think that well-being=good is far more sensible than God(or his nature)=good

I don’t think there’s anything we can say to each other in that case. Craig showed very clearly that well-being != good. Plus it doesn’t answer the question of ontological grounding. That is what’s at issue here. You seem to be making the incessant mistake of conflating moral ontology and epistemology.

Given all that Sam Harris et al have said about the god of Christianity, to claim good is a properly basic property of God is begging the question.

Unfortunately you can’t use question-begging arguments from people who cannot account for objective morality as a basis for this kind of claim. Try again.

Irony: Decrying the delusional atheist for attacking christian theology in a supposedly sterile debate about moral philosophy, and then appealing to that same theology to defend problems with the philosophy. Talk about having your cake and eating it too.

What’s ironic is that the “problem” you’re pointing to is actually just the nature of having an ontological ground for moral values. I explicitly included my comment about how we know that maliciousness and capriciousness are not good to demonstrate that circularity is a necessary part of any sort of “foundationalist” view, whether it be about moral values or ontology in general or epistemology in general. I was hoping it would help you understand the basics of the position. Unfortunately you just seem to have tripped over it again.

You, saying, essentially, that the good is what it is because it is God.

You still haven’t explained why this is a problem. You don’t seem to like the idea that goodness is a necessary, properly basic quality. You seem to think that when we say “God is good”, we must have some other referent for the term “good” in mind. But you continue to avoid defending this claim. If in fact goodness is grounded in God, then to say that God is good is to say that God has his own moral nature. Any other conception we have of good is contingent on God’s existence. Let me remind you again that we’re not dealing with a question of epistemology (how do we know what is good) but a question of ontology (what is the nature of goodness in terms of its actual existence).

Wrt the argument from reason, I just happened to run across this quote a few minutes ago, which is pertinent:

If thought is merely the motion of physical components in the brain (or anywhere else in the organism for that matter), how can I remember a previous experience? Once a motion becomes a past motion, it never recurs as the same motion. How could one know or even be aware of generic similarities between two motions? To classify two entities within the same genus, I must observe some similarity between them. But materialism claims that the thought “This motion and that motion are similar” would also itself be merely a motion. And before the motion of predicating that similarity occurs, the motion of the original experience and the motion of the alleged memory experience would be in the past, and no longer exist. And no motion could connect two motions that no longer exist. Consequently, for it to be even possible for me to think generically similar thoughts, which is necessary to remember anything, I must assume that materialism is false.

Redacted from Stuart Hackett, The Resurrection of Theism, pages 222-223, any edition.

Man, I lost all respect for William Lane Craig after this debate. Sam Harris is right. “God”, especially Craig’s God that he didn’t want to defend, isn’t where we get morality. When we speak about morality, it’s already predefined. In fact, it is pretty much how Harris says: it has something to do with optimizing the well-being of conscious creatures. Anything that isn’t doing that can not be called “moral”, and anyone that suggest otherwise doesn’t know what their talking about.

It makes perfect sense, and I am no longer a Christian after listening to this debate. Sam Harris, for the win!

Andy

Andy,

I don’t know you or your situation but I suspect that if your Christian faith rested on the William Lane Craig’s moral argument, or his reliability, then you were never really a Christian to begin with. Let’s say you are right, and Craig was completely off the wall on this one – why would this lead you to abandon Christianity? I think there must be some other factor that tipped the scales for you, for with those things alone your decision to abandon the Christian faith just makes no sense.

But are you right on this one? Was William Lane Craig off the wall in this debate? In response to your comments above,

1) Well, the debate wasn’t on God’s existence, so if Craig didn’t defend the existence of God and chose instead to remain on topic, you can’t indict him for doing so. And actually, he is willing to defend to the exitsence of God, in numerous debates, books and published articles.

2) In the debate, Craid did not disagree with Harris’ point that morality does something like optimizing the well-being of conscious creatures. In fact, he spelled out very clearly that he shared many of Harris’ moral values. You see, the question of the debate was not on what morality does. Neither was the question on what moral are (i.e. their nature) – both agreed that morality was objective. Rather, the debate was on whether a non-supernatural foundation for the objective morality they both affirm is reasonable (or is as reasonable as a supernatural foundation).

Harris purports to argue for this in his book. Craig disagrees. This was the topic of the debate. Nothing else.

The debate has been rigourously critiqued, and when you understand what the debate was actually on, then you should understand that Harris was completely trampled. He completely failed to answer any of Craig’s objections, and his counter-arguments were for the most part totally irrelevant.

I think you should re-consider very carefully your conclusions on this debate, and do some serious soul-searching when it comes to Christianity and why you believe it, especially with respect to the person of Christ and why you onced trusted in him for salvation, and why you no longer do.

Greetings. Let me congratulate you on your hard work in the examination of this debate. I too felt that the weight of the debate tipped for William Lane Craig. But, I am writing with a bit of a different perspective.

I study religion and neuroscience and find it fascinating how people can look at the very same event and come to two (or more) different conclusions. This debate is a fine example. Allow me to suggest that what Sam Harris is offering is no different in its form than any religion. From a neuroscience perspective, the material world (material in which we human are also composed of) requires an interpretation. This is true for car crashes, fights resulting in someone murdered, or the very words that you are reading now – there are parts of your brain wondering how much “stock” I should “put into” this guy who is writing this post – all of these mentioned are events that your brain tries to interpret in a way that make sense of the world in which it navigates. So, when people watch this debate they too must perceive and interpret its’ meaning and message.

So for people who are “committed” to atheism or scientism, for example, they will find it “easier” to accept a win for Sam Harris. Their brain has created the world in this way – where the beliefs of Sam Harris can “fit” more comfortably. On the other hand, those who are theists can comfortably receive Craig’s position because of the way their brains have put the world together. So, in a sense, if you remember the picture of the “Wife and the Mother-in-Law”, where some people see the young woman easier than the Mother-in-Law (or vice-versa), this debate and others works in a similar way.

So, if I may conclude, that for one person to say that the other side is not being objective then this is true for the person making that argument as well. Only in unique circumstances, where people feel “safe” enough to challenge the way their brain makes sense of the world in which they live, can people begin to venture into new beliefs and “experience” new thought patterns that permit them to change belief systems. So, this makes sense – at least to me ? – why someone could walk away from this debate with a different conclusion.

If you have read this “thanks for your time” and may the God of your Tradition bring you blessings.

Hi Michael,

True. Different interpretations are to be expected given the people have different findamental beliefs, preconceptions and brains conditioned for different patterns of thinking. But don’t make the mistake of confusing the variety of conclusions about the debate with actual relativism, where no conclusion is better than any other. Debates have objective winners and loosers, just as words have defintions that are objectively right and wrong. What matters is people have epistemic humilty where humilty is due, and use reason and arguments to support their views on who was the winner.

Thank you Stuart for your response. I won’t “trouble” you too much more I promise :-)

Relativism, it seems to me, is what we are limited to “in one sense”. Because there are times that our brains/minds cannot accept “a truth”. I am sure you have met some of those in your blogging and in other parts of your life. But, they (and we) can only accept a truth — even if there is proof positive — when we are ready. And the constant processing (or thinking) of these “new ideas” — when they are presented to us — help us to accept them.

**But that “truth” that our brains / minds cannot accept is — I believe — exists.** This, of course, is a personal belief but I’m not sure I would refer to that as “objective”.

But I do think that objectivity, as you believe it to be, is not as easy as you may think. Our brains have to re-create reality for us to respond to. The world outside the brain appears to be very different than what we imagine it to be. You see, I believe that our brains are only concerned with that information that it needs to survive. The other information it may record in a sub-consciouse way or even ignore it completely. Therefore, I like what you say about epistemic humility — which we see so little of today — especially in the West.

But, I am approaching this from a neuroscience perspective so my apologies if this all sounds a little strange to you.

But, I do wish to say: keep up the great work Stuart. I admire your determination to defend your Faith.

I now “bow to you” for the last word …
Cheers

I still don’t see how Craig thrashed Harris like “a naughty puppy”, but that being said; I wasn’t particularly impressed with Harris performance. But then again, that’s probably because I wasn’t too impressed with Craig’s arguments either, and expected Harris to easily refute them.
Craig’s arguments on objective morality aren’t difficult to beat. One need only look at how different ethnic groups, or even different species in some cases, develop different ethical codes of conduct to see how morality is based in societal order, not in the supernatural.
Even within certain societies of chimpanzees it’s obviously considered unethical to steal food, as breaking that code may result in total exclusion from the group. In other words, it’s been found that altruistic behavior isn’t necessarily reserved for human beings.
The higher up you get the evolutionary ladder, the more complex the species’ way of maintaing order becomes, and that’s the point; order and morality are intertwinedly related. Thusly, religion becomes an excellent candidate for maintaining order, as the origin of such moral laws are attributed to a higher authority, which again is a reflection of the primate tendency towards hierarchical order.
Most religions seem to agree that a life of wrongdoing leads to punishment in the afterlife, and vice versa, which at least to me indicates a common necessity to justify a society’s moral laws. However, this is most likely due to the realization that a society without order is no society at all.

Human beings are social creatures, we’re more or less dependent on company, and thusly moral values and guidelines seems ever so important. It’s based in social interaction and the common good. So objective morality to me is basically a matter of consensus; it’s the specific society that defines what is commonly good.

Maybe I haven’t scoped the depth of Craig’s argument according to his followers, and by all means; point out where I’m wrong. But still, I can’t for the life of me figure out why one has to invoke the supernatural to explain morality.
It’s one of Craig’s weakest arguments, and Harris didn’t do much to refute it.

Craig’s arguments on objective morality aren’t difficult to beat. One need only look at how different ethnic groups, or even different species in some cases, develop different ethical codes of conduct to see how morality is based in societal order, not in the supernatural.

Sadly, Ole, you have managed to not only commit a flagrant non sequitur, but you also seem completely oblivious to the point Craig repeatedly hammered home in the debate.

1. The non sequitur: How moral duties differ between ethnic groups says nothing whatsoever about the ultimate basis of those duties, or of moral values. If you believe otherwise, by all means show us the logical inference from the premise “Different ethnic groups develop different ethical codes of conduct” to the conclusion, “Therefore, morality is a purely social construct” (I’m guessing that’s the conclusion you meant to imply—since “based in societal order” is pretty vague).

2. The point that sailed right over your head: what does any given moral code have to do with the ontological status of moral values? You’re committing the same category error that Harris did. The one Craig repeatedly called out, clarified, corrected. You’re confusing moral epistemology with moral ontology. But how we know moral duties has nothing to do with what moral duties actually are.

Even within certain societies of chimpanzees it’s obviously considered unethical to steal food, as breaking that code may result in total exclusion from the group.

Needless to say, this is some pretty patent question-begging you’re engaging in. You see behavior in chimps that you think looks like morality, so you assume that’s what it is. But morality entails obligation, and there’s no evidence chimps have the slightest conception of obligation. So while there may be some superficial similarities between certain chimp behavior and human moral behavior, you’re hardly justified in assuming that chimps have moral codes.

Most religions seem to agree that a life of wrongdoing leads to punishment in the afterlife, and vice versa, which at least to me indicates a common necessity to justify a society’s moral laws.

Since Christianity is not most religions, and does not agree with this, I’m not sure why you bring it up.

Maybe I haven’t scoped the depth of Craig’s argument according to his followers, and by all means; point out where I’m wrong. But still, I can’t for the life of me figure out why one has to invoke the supernatural to explain morality.
It’s one of Craig’s weakest arguments, and Harris didn’t do much to refute it.

I’m afraid you just don’t understand Craig’s argument. You should go through it a few more times and note the critical distinction I’ve pointed out between epistemology and ontology. His argument is not an epistemological one as you have assumed; it is an ontological one.

Hello Ole Mattis

You haven’t even grazed the problem of a foundation for objective morality, since what you have describes is subjective morality. This is exactly what Craig always says, in the absense of God there isn’t any good reason why morality isn’t just a social construct. In this sense a rapist isn’t really doing something wrong, he is just acting outside the dictates of fashion, like someone who belches at the table, or prefers vanilla over chocolate, or whole societies such as Americans who drive on the wrong side of the road.