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How do we reconcile the “violent” Old Testament God with Jesus?

The slaughter of the Canaanites is one of the most troubling passages in the Old Testament. Not only has it been used to justify colonialism and ethnic violence, it also seems to reveal a picture of God that appears at odds with Jesus’ portrayal of God in the New Testament.

How should we try to understand this apparent contradiction?

Branson Parler, writing for the Missioalliance blog, offers some good thoughts about this question and particularly the attempt to downplay or dismiss the accuracy of the Old Tesament portrait.

“One popular answer is that the conquest narratives record Israel’s projection onto God rather than God’s actual instructions to Israel. God is not really judging the inhabitants of Canaan with Israel as his instrument, its proponents say, Israel is simply rationalizing its own selfish drive to possess the land. In order to transcend Israel’s faulty and murderous self-justification, they then encourage us to read later texts, such as the Gospels, over against these problematic earlier texts. The more this interpretation prevails the more popular it has become to speak of “God’s violence” rather than “God’s justice” or “God’s judgment.” After all, if unseemly OT texts simply amount to human projections onto God, then we create “God” in our violent image rather than witness to a God who is just in all his ways…

Yet there is a fatal flaw with this interpretive approach. In the biblical narrative, the logic of conquest, exile, and cross are actually tied together. The way we approach one determines how we approach all three.

….If you think the conquest narratives are problematic, the exile narratives are more so. In terms of sheer volume, the Bible talks far more about God’s judgment on disobedient Israel through Assyria and Babylon than it does about God’s judgment on the Canaanites. In terms of judgment and terror, the narrative in Joshua is quite tame in comparison to the covenant curses of Deuteronomy 28, which promise Israel that the destruction of one’s family, land, and property will drive people mad, that the horror experienced by Israel will become a “byword among the nations,” and that parents will cannibalize their own children. As Jeremiah laments, “With their own hands, compassionate women have cooked their own children, who became their food when my people were destroyed” (Lamentations 4:10). If the idea that “God judges sinful people through a chosen instrument” is a projection, then no one is projecting more than the biblical prophets who warn God’s covenant people repeatedly to turn or suffer the consequences.”

Parler points out that explaining away the conquest passages also has implications for how we understand Jesus and his mission:

“…[I]f accounts of God’s judgment are mere projections, of course, then Jesus’s beliefs about the exile and his own role in bringing about the end of exile were wrong. … if Jesus’s account of Israel’s covenant and his role in relation to it was wrong, then Jesus doesn’t reveal Israel’s God. Far from it, he reveals his own confusion and ignorance by projecting onto God the idea that he had to die for the sins of his people (a confusion then perpetuated throughout the rest of the New Testament). And of course if Jesus was confused about what the Father wanted, then he was neither the Messiah nor the eternal Son. In other words, if you pay close attention to the biblical narrative, you cannot consistently interpret Joshua as a projection onto God and Jesus as the full revelation of God.”

But what about using these passages to justify violence today?

“Many people think that if one affirms that God commanded Israel to do what they did in Joshua, then it implies God’s stamp of approval on any and all actions of war (or at least just war). But this is not at all the case. I affirm God’s providential use of Assyria, Babylon, and Rome to judge, but that does not mean that the actions of the rulers or armies of those nations were morally good. For example, after Isaiah notes that God is going to use Assyria to judge, his application of the message is not “Go join the Assyrian army”; for they too will be judged in turn for their wickedness (Isa. 10). Likewise, when Jesus notes that Jerusalem will be judged, he doesn’t encourage his followers to defect to the Roman armies…

The point of all this is recognizing God’s proper place and authority to judge. God has the right to do this; we do not.”

He concludes,

“[H]ere’s the rub: the God created by those who insist on talking about divine “violence” is more a projection than the God attested to by Joshua, Jeremiah, and Jesus. A violent God rather than a just God is the product of the contemporary failure to read Scripture closely, faithfully, and directionally.”

Read the whole thing here. It’s a great post.

For more books on the topic of the Old Testament wars, check out Is God a Moral Monster? by Paul Copan, God Behaving Badly by David Lamb, The God I Don’t Understand by Chris Wright, and Holy War in the Bible edited by Heath A Thomas, Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan.

The Dead Sea Scrolls Online

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In a joint project with the Israel Museum, Google have put the Dead Sea Scrolls online for the first time. Considered one of the most significant archaeological finds of the 20th century, the Dead Sea Scrolls date from around 250 BC to 68 AD and comprise some 800 documents in many tens of thousands of fragments. The ancient scrolls were first discovered by a Bedouin shepherd in 1947 and continue to be studied and scrutinized by scholars. As well as shedding a great deal of light on the Jewish world at the time of Jesus, the scrolls also demonstrate the accuracy of our modern-day Old Testament in representing what the original authors first wrote.

Explore the scrolls here: http://dss.collections.imj.org.il/

In this video, New Testament professor Craig A. Evans discusses the Biblical manuscripts, textual criticism, and the Dead Sea Scrolls (HT Brian LePort):

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His book on the Dead Sea Scrolls is available from Amazon and B&H Publishing.

Why Should we Read the Old Testament, and How? Iain Provan in Auckland

Regent College’s Iain Provan will be in Auckland next month. Compass have organised for him to give a talk on the topic: ‘Why Should we Read the Old Testament, and How?’ on Monday 4 July, 7pm to 9pm at Greenlane Christian Centre, 17 Marewa Road, Greenlane, Auckland. Read more

Penal Sanctions in the Mosaic Law Part II

In Part I I suggested that the capital sanctions found in The Torah in most cases were not intended to be carried out, that instead there operated an implicit assumption that a person who committed a serious crime had forfeited their life and hence was to pay a ransom as decided by the courts as a substitute. One area where this claim seems to make particular sense is in the laws governing adultery that occur in the book of Deuteronomy.

In the article I cited in the previous post, David Brink, addresses Deuteronomy 22: 13-21. Brink claims this teaches “that the community can and should stone to death any women whose husband finds she was not a virgin on her wedding night.”

I’ll start with two minor points. First, Brink assumes that this is addressed to “the community,” by which I assume he means contemporary communities. This is false; it is addressed to ancient Israel’s community as any reading of the opening chapters of Deuteronomy clearly show. How The Mosaic Law relates to contemporary Christians is a detailed and vexed topic of biblical hermenutics yet Brink ignores the issues and simply assumes that it addresses us directly.

Second, this text deals with adultery and not pre-marital sex. As Gordon Wenham notes pre-marital sex is addressed a few lines later in Deuteronomy 22: 28-29.[1] Wenham notes that the case Brink cites (Dt 22:13-21) deals with adultery.[2] In ANE law, betrothal was considered a binding marriage; women were betrothed young and often some time before they consummated the marriage. This case deals with betrothed women who after betrothal and prior to consummation has sex with a third party. As I note in footnote 15, this is a minor point. I am sure Brink is not allayed by the fact that she is to be executed for adultery as opposed to pre-marital sex, his problem is clearly execution related; that said, it is important that one not exaggerate what the text says.

Third, as I argued in Part I, when The Torah prescribes that a person be executed, the implict assumption is that this will not be carried out but some lesser financial penalty will be inflicted as a ransom. This seems to be borne out by an examination of this law.

Brink refers to Deuteronomy 22:13-21, in particular “if … the charge is true and no proof of the girl’s virginity can be found … the men of her town shall stone her to death.” What Brink does not focus on is the sentence if the charges prove to be false; if the husband is simply slandering his bride. In this instance the husband suffers three penalties, first he is subjected to some unspecified punishment which would be at the discretion of the court. It is clear that this is not execution because the text assumes that he will continue to be married to the women in the future. Second the husband shall pay “100 shekels of silver” to the father and lose his right to divorce. Wenham explains the rationale for this price:

The husband claims that by giving him a dud wife (for his 50 shekels) his father in law had in effect stolen the sum from him. Two legal principles are therefore applicable those dealing with theft and false witness. The penalty for theft of deposited property is double restitution according to Ex xii7. But according to Deut xix19 and other ancient near eastern laws false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated”[3]

This explains the 100 shekels; the problem is that it raises an issue which Wenham is aware of. “[A]ccording to Deut xix19 false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated.” If this law meant that substantiation of the husband’s accusation would actually result in the execution of his wife then the failure to substantiate his claim would mean that the husband would be executed, but he is not. Apart from the fine to the father, his other punishment is an unspecified punishment (which is not execution) and loss of his right to divorce. It appears then that the actual execution of the woman was not envisaged. Wenham suggests then a substitute must have been envisaged in this text if it was to be read as coherent and consistent with the other laws in Deuteronomy.

This conclusion seems to be strengthened by several other passages that deal with the same topic. Two chapters later, Deuteronomy 24:1-5, The Torah deals with a case where a man divorces his wife, “who becomes displeasing to him because he finds something indecent about her.” This same passage is cited by Jesus in the synoptic gospels. David Instone-Brewer has argued, convincingly, that the reference to “something indecent” is interpreted by Christ as referring to adultery.[4] This passage then deals with the same situation as Deuteronomy 24; the text tells us she is divorced and by implication loses her mohar money but is silent on any other punishment. However, the woman is clearly not executed as she marries another man in v 2. This makes sense if the capital sanctions for adultery function as admonitory devices and in practice, a ransom was made as a substitute (possibly alongside a lesser sentence) but it does not make sense if a women who was discovered to have committed adultery by her husband was required to be executed.

A similar picture emerges in a second passage Wenham cites. In the book of proverbs the author warns his son about adultery and refers to the judicial consequences that will ensue if he does not heed this warning.[5] It is clear that a ransom substitute is envisaged, moreover, it suggests that if the husband refuses to accept a ransom payment the adulterer will suffer blows and disgrace, note that execution is not envisaged. In fact, the discussions in Proverbs suggest the consequences will be financial loss and social ostracism. This all makes sense on the hypothesis mentioned in Part I but does not make sense if adultery was in fact punished by death. Wenham notes this point and draws the conclusion that in Deuteronomy 22:13-21 the law envisaged a substitute.

In conclusion, sceptics like David Brink often cite passages like Deuteronomy 22:13-21 in horror to discredit Christianity. However, they erroneously assume superficial literalistic renditions of the passages in question. In this instance, the genre of the passage, in light of the common ANE legal practices and customs suggests that capital sanctions function as a kind of hyperbole and in practice a ransom was paid and the punishment mitigated.

This practice is implicitly assumed in many of the Old Testament laws about homicide. Reading it this way renders the laws in Deuteronomy consistent with each other and with the reference to adultery in the book of Proverbs. Further, it also coheres better with our moral intuitions in the way a literalistic reading does not.

In my final post in this series I will look at Brink’s response to the kind of argument I have advanced in this series and his appeal to dialectical equilibrium.

[1] In “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age,” Vetus Testamentum 22 (1972) 326-348, Gordon Wenham points out that the same law is also spelled out in Exodus 22:15 and it is treated as a relatively minor offense; the penalty is simply that the man must pay the “mohar” to the bride’s father. A mohar was security money (50 shekels) that the groom paid to the bride’s father. It was held in trust for the woman in case the man later abandoned her or divorced her without just cause. See the discussion in David Instone Brewer Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
[2] Wenham “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age.”
[3] Ibid 332.
[4] Brewer Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible.
[5] Proverbs 6.

Cross Posted at MandM

Penal Sanctions in the Mosaic Law Part I

In my recent debate with Raymond Bradley I questioned Ray’s understanding of the death penalty in the Old Testament. Since then a few people have asked me to explain and elaborate on my position. This three-part series is a response to some issues within secular ethicist and philosopher David Brink’s article “The Autonomy of Ethics” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, which I wrote last year. Brink’s position is similar to Ray’s so this series should explain my position further.

In “The Autonomy of Ethics,” David Brink writes that a literal reading of the Old Testament,

[Y]ields problematic moral claims, such as Deuteronomy’s claims that parents can and should stone to death rebellious children (21:18-21) and that the community can and should stone to death any wife whose husband discovers that she was not a virgin when he married her (22:13-21). We have more reason to accept secular scientific and moral claims than we do to accept a literal reading of these particular religious texts.[1]

In a footnote Brink refers to several other references to capital punishment in the Old Testament for various different crimes.[2]

I respect Brink’s stature as an ethicist, however, as an interpreter of scripture his work has left a lot to be desired. That said, I find the kind of hermeneutics he employs common in sceptical literature, so I will address what he says here.

One principle of interpreting literature is to interpret a text according to its genre. One does not read poetry, for example as science or scientific theorems as songs or math texts as romantic fiction. The book of Deuteronomy, in terms of its structure, literary form and language, parallels the structure and language of Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) legal texts. Many of the cases given are similar to the cases and laws in these texts. As such, this raises the issue as to how references to capital punishment function in such texts.

In a study of ANE legal corpus, Raymond Westbrook notes that seemingly harsh penalties are common in such codes. In old Babylonian law, the hand that assaults is severed; a man who kisses another’s wife has his lips cut off; a person who steals bees is to be stung by bees; a person who had thrown his victim into an oven was to be thrown into an oven; a man who raped another’s wife would be sentenced to having his own wife or daughter raped; a negligent builder whose house collapsed and killed another’s son would be sentenced to having his own son killed, and so on.[3] In fact, the Code of Hammurabi states that if a man knocks out the eye of one of the upper classes, his eye must be knocked out.[4]

Not only are these punishments harsh but they both appear inconsistent with the legal practice that occurred in these cultures and also with themselves in some instances. Westbrook notes “[s]ome law codes impose physical punishments and others payments for the same offenses, while some codes have a mixture of the two.”[5] Westbrook notes that the contradiction is only apparent because “in highlighting one or the other alternative, the codes are making a statement as to their view of the gravity of the offence.”[6] The laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[7] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.”[8]

Westbrook points to the practice of “ransoming” as providing an explanation of how this worked in application. In ANE legal practice a person who committed a serious crime would be considered to have forfeited their life or limb, this, however, did not mean they were executed or mutilated. Instead they could ransom their life or limb by making a monetary payment and/or agreeing to some lesser penalty, usually decided by the courts. This background was implicitly accepted and understood to apply.

Westbrook is not eccentric in this view. J J Finkelstein makes a similar point reflecting on what appears to be very harsh capital (and sometimes vicarious) sentences in the code of Hammurabi and the absurdity and impossibility of putting them into practice. As Finkelstein notes, one law which states that a physician whose patient dies in surgery or is blinded by surgery is to have his hand cut off. Finkelstein remarks that “it is inconceivable that any sane person in ancient Mesopotamia would have been willing to enter the surgeon’s profession if such a law were literally enforced.”[9] On the other hand, “if a system of ransom were assumed where the life of the builder or his son could be redeemed and the hand of the physician could be redeemed by pecuniary ransom, these laws would not only have an admonitory function (for which the more graphic statement of the penalty–execution or mutilation–is more effective), but would also be practical as law.”[10]

He concludes that Mesopotamian penalty prescriptions,

[W]ere not meant to be complied with literally even when they were first drawn up, [But rather they] serve an admonitory function. If one would be bold enough to restate Hammurabi’s 230 as a direct admonition it might run to this effect: “woe to the contractor who undertakes construction and in his greed cuts corners”.[11]

Interestingly many commentators of The Torah have noted it appears to operate with the same assumption. This is particularly evident with the laws regarding homicide. Ex 21: 29-32 deals with a case where an ox gores another person to death due to negligence on the part of the owner. The penalty stated is that the negligent person shall be put to death. However, immediately preceding this, provision is made for a monetary fine to be paid instead of execution. Joe Sprinkle comments,

[V] 29 applies the principle of [life for life], a man whose negligence has caused the loss of a life forfeits his own life. But v. 30 goes on to show that this operates within a system that permits a payment of money to take the place of the actual execution of the offender.”[12]

Sprinkle goes on to conclude, “In sum, there is good reason to suppose that the death sentence of v. 29 is mostly hyperbole to underscore the seriousness of negligence which threatens the life of another human being.”[13]

A second example cited by Sprinkle occurs in the book of Kings. Here an incident is mentioned where a person has committed a capital crime. The sentence is announced “a life for a life”; however, the immediate context shows what this sentence was. “It will be your life for his life or you must weigh out a talent of silver.” Sprinkle notes that here again “’life for life’ in the sense of capital punishment has an explicit alternative of monetary substitution.”[14]

Perhaps the clearest example is on noted by Walter Kaiser. In Exodus 21:13-14 the law clearly distinguishes between accidental and premeditated homicide. If a man who has struck another and killed that person (an analogous case to a man striking a woman and killing her) seeks sanctuary, he is to be provided it unless he “lay in wait” for his victim. Jackson notes that “lay in wait” referred to premeditated homicide.[15] In Numbers 35 the same law is expounded in more detail; a homicide where a person “lay in wait” is contrasted with a homicide where the assailant “attacked him suddenly without enmity.”[16] This appears to be a reference to an intentional but not premeditated attack such as a ‘crime of passion.’

After laying out clearly and repeatedly that the a person who kills in pre-meditation “shall surely be put to death” the text goes on to state “’Do not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death… .” Bloodshed pollutes the land, and atonement cannot be made for the land on which blood has been shed, except by the blood of the one who shed it.” Unless there was an assumed practice of “ransoming” the lives of those under a capital sentence, this comment seems superfluous. Sprinkle notes “The availability of ransom seems to have been so prevalent that when biblical law wants to exclude it, as in the case of intentional murder, it must specifically prohibit it”.[17]

In, Towards an Old Testament Ethics, Walter Kaiser draws the same conclusion,

The key text in this discussion is Num 35:31: “Do not accept a ransom [or substitute] for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death.” There were some sixteen crimes that called for the death penalty in the OT…. Only in the case of premeditated murder did the text say that the officials in Israel were forbidden to take a “ransom” or a “substitute”. This has widely been interpreted to imply that in all the other fifteen cases the judges could commute the crimes deserving of capital punishment by designating a “ransom” or “substitute”. In that case the death penalty served to mark the seriousness of the crime.[18]

In Part II I will argue that this understanding of the references to capital punishment in The Torah makes best sense of the laws regarding adultery that Brink cites.

[1] David Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
[2] Ibid, note 17, 164.
[3] See Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
[4] Code of Hammurabi, 195-196, also 199.
[5] Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 71-78.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] J. J. Finkelstein The Ox that Gored (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1981) 34-35.
[10] Joe Sprinkle “The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 (Lex Talonis) and Abortion,” Westminster Theological Journal 55 (1993) 241
[11] Finkelstein The Ox that Gored 35.
[12] Sprinkle “The Interpretation of Exodus” 238.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid, 233-53.
[15] Bernard Jackson. “The Problems of Exodus 21:22-25 (Ius Talionis),” Vetus Testamentum 23 (1973) 288-290.
[16] Num. 35:22.
[17] Jackson “The Problems of Exodus” 239.
[18] Walter Kaiser, “Gods Promise Plan and his Gracious Law,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 35:3 (1992) 293.

Cross Posted at MandM

Did God order genocide in the Old Testament against the Canaanites?

One of the most difficult episodes to understand in the Old Testament is God’s command for Israel to kill the Canaanites. Paul Copan, a philosophy and ethics professor at Palm Beach Atlantic University, has made available an article, due out in the next issue of Philosophia Christi addressing this topic. The President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (he also blogs at Parchment and Pen), Copan evaluates the passages in the context of archaeology and Ancient Near East literature  and argues that the evidence suggests that  the Canaanites who were killed were combatants rather than noncombatants (“Scenario 1”) and that, given the profound moral corruption of Canaan, this divinely-directed act was just.” Should this scenario be shown to be false, he also maintains that “even if it turns out that noncombatants were directly targeted (“Scenario 2”), the overarching Old Testament narrative is directed toward the salvation of all nations–including the Canaanites.”

The Canaanite campaign jars our moral sensibilities and jeopardizes our confidence in the Bible as a supernaturally inspired interpretation of history. Christians therefore have an obligation to try to understand this episode and Copan’s article, as a follow-up to his eariler essay on this issue (“Is Yahweh a Moral Monster? The New Atheists and Old Testament Ethics”), is very helpful in this regard.

I have tried to summarize the main points but if you’re interested in the topic, I strongly recommend that you read the whole thing.

Firstly, Copan argues that God’s judgment on the Canaanites was not only morally just but that evidence also indicates that the Israelite campaign was directed primarily at military combatants (Scenario 1):

1. The Canaanites were morally corrupt.
There was a profound moral corruption amongst the Canaanites that called out for God’s justice, in keeping with His salvation historical purposes. The divine judgment enacted upon the nation was consistent with God’s oracles against other nation states that had crossed moral thresholds. The Canaanite campaign is also, in a sense, anticipatory of the final judgment where justice will be firmly established on a cosmic scale. (Also see Clay Jones, “We Don’t Hate Sin So We Don’t Understand What Happened to the Canaanites: An Addendum to ‘Divine Genocide’ Arguments,” Philosophia Christi 11 (2009): 53–72.))

2. The Canaanites were morally culpable.
God has made available moral ideals and insights through general revelation to Gentile nations such that they are sufficiently accountable. Prophetic warnings as in Amos 1 -2 demonstrate that God can hold other nations responsible for stifling compassion, suppressing their consciences, and carrying out particularly heinous acts. The language used in the New Testament of the Gentile population also confirms this (“disobedient” (Heb. 11:31)–a term indicating a moral awareness of wrongdoing but a refusal to turn from it and also Paul’s affirmation of those outside the Sinai covenant who possess the capacity (through conscience) to distinguish right from wrong (Rom. 2:14–15))

3. The preservation of Rahab’s family demonstrated the possibility of amnesty.
Rahab’s embrace of Yahweh and discovery of salvation exhibited both the compassionate character of Yahweh and His to relent from judgment, whether Canaanite, Ninevite (Jon. 4:2) or those from any “nation” that “turns from its evil” (Jer. 18:7–8). It is Yahweh’s desire that the wicked turn rather than die (Ezek. 18:31–32; 33:11) but once a nation surpasses a point of no moral and spiritual return, God will intervene (as He did even upon Israel and Judah (2 Chron. 36:16; cp. 2 Kings 18:11–12; 1 Chron. 5:23) ).

4. The Canaanite campaign was not motivated by racial hatred or ethnic superiority.
Yahweh repeatedly commands Israel to show concern for strangers and aliens in their midst (for example, Lev. 19:34; Deut. 10:18–19) and throughout the Old Testament this theme is evident in the way enemies of Israel are shown as eventual objects of His salvation and are consequently incorporated into the people of God (Ps 87). Yahweh’s concern for the nations and His continual reminder that the taking of the land is not due to Israel’s intrinsic superiority (“indeed, the Israelites are “a stubborn people” (Deut. 9:4–6)”) hardly supports a Gentile-hating, arrogant ethnocentrism.

5. The religious dimension of Israel’s campaign cannot be equated with the sanctioning of human sacrifice.
The OT passages that treat Israel’s motivation for the campaign highlight punishment against idolaters (especially those who have lead Israel astray or committed injustice against her), the total destruction of warriors and the consecration to God of everything that was captured. Further, the OT strongly condemns child sacrifice as the epitome of anti-Yahwist and anti-social behavior. Even to take certain (dubious) readings as demonstrating the act of sacrifice is to forget that not all behavioral examples included in Scripture are good ones (cp. 1 Cor. 10:1–12) and in fact the theology of Judges emphasizes the nadir of Israelite morality and religion.

6. The rhetorical devices common to Ancient Near East (ANE) literature must be taken into account when understanding the passages that talk of total obliteration.

The phrase “all that breathes” is a standard ANE expression of military bravado and refers to total victory and the crushing defeat over one’s enemies. The accounts made clear that many inhabitants remained in the land and prescriptions against alliances and intermarriage with them actually assumed this.

7. Following OT scholar Richard Hess, it can be argued that the Canaanites targeted for destruction were the political leaders and their armies rather than noncombatants. The language employed appears to be stereotypical for describing all the inhabitants of a town or region, without forcing the reader to conclude anything further about their ages or even their genders.

8. Both the language and archaeological evidence point to Jericho, Ai, and the other targeted cities in Canaan as military forts, lacking civilian populations.
The actual battles in Joshua do not mention noncombatants and excavated physical evidence show that,  for example, Jericho was a military settlement and therefore all those killed were warriors.

9. The methods of Israel’s warfare demonstrate restraint and lack the bloodthirsty fervor of similar ANE annals.
Many battles were defensive and in response to calculated assaults and attempts to lead Israel into immorality. God often prohibited Israel from conquering other neighbouring nations.

10. The Canaanite campaign did not set down a pattern or legitimize similar action for later Israel or even professing Christians.
The killing of the Canaanites was deliberately limited in scope and restricted to a specific period of time. Neither Deuteronomy nor Joshua imply the campaign as precedent-setting and successive OT leaders did not take it as such. We see do not see Saul, David or the other leaders of Israel and Judah undertaking similar action against Assyria, Babylon, Persia, or the local equivalents of the Canaanites in the Second Temple period. Christians that have sought to justify their military campaigns with the killing of the Canaanites ignore Jesus clear own kingdom teaching (Matt 26:52; John 18:36).

However, even if the evidence was overturned and it could be shown that women and children were explicit targets of the campaign (Scenairo 2):

1. For the Israelites, the killing of the Canaanites would have been a grim task but in the ANE, warfare was a way of life and a means of survival.
Combatant and noncombatant would not have been easily distinguished and in combination with the hardness of human hearts (Matt. 19:8) and human moral bluntedness in the ANE, would have likely rendered such actions considerably less psychologically damaging for the Israelite soldier.

2. The Canaanite campaign must be set within the context of God’s overarching goal to bring blessing and salvation to all the nations, including the Canaanites, through Abraham (Gen. 12:3; 22:17–18; cp. 28:13–14). The killing of the Canaanites is not the norm but a troubling exception, apart of a background of Yahweh’s enemy-loving character and worldwide salvific purposes. While simultaneously punishing a morally wicked people and seeking to establish Israel in the land, God was certainly willing to preserve any who acknowledged his evident lordship over the nations, which was very well known to the Canaanites (Josh. 2:8–11; 9:9–11, 24; cf. Exod. 15:14–17; Deut. 2:25).

3. We should expect God’s purposes to be often unclear and even baffling, but not let this eclipse the overwhelming revelation of God’s trustworthy character.
We cannot measure God by our own defective standards, afterall, humanity is incapable of refereeing God’s actions. Apart from God, we have no transcultural standpoint to assess the moral fitness of a culture, least of all, judge God Himself and His purposes in judgment. We must remember both His “kindness and severity” (Rom. 11:22) and realize God’s unique cosmic authority will seek to correct our profoundly selfish human ways, even in civil contexts. Given the inadequacy of our “cognitive position”, and the recognition that even in human relationships there must be room for trust, the full picture of God’s purposes may not always be available to us.